Aquarius currently splits trading fees:
This proposal would introduce a conditional fee split:
When daily trading volume is $10 million or less
When daily trading volume is greater than $10 million
The burn mechanism would therefore only apply when Aquarius records more than $10 million in daily trading volume.
For every $1 of trading fees generated on a qualifying day:
On days when trading volume is $10 million or less, the existing 50% / 50% split would remain unchanged.
The existing weekly fee conversion would also remain unchanged.
Every Wednesday, collected fees would continue to be converted into AQUA. The applicable fee split would be determined according to whether the relevant daily trading volume exceeded the $10 million threshold. On qualifying days, the portion representing 40% of trading fees would be distributed as Voting Incentives, while the portion representing 10% would be sent to the AQUA issuer account and permanently removed from circulation.
The burn would continue until total AQUA supply reaches 50 billion AQUA, at which point it would pause for a new governance review.
The proposed burn mechanism would only activate when Aquarius trading volume is greater than $10 million in a single day.
This threshold is intended to ensure that the mechanism only applies once Aquarius has reached a meaningful level of trading activity.
The threshold would operate as follows:
The threshold would apply to the trading activity used to calculate the relevant daily fee allocation. It would not change the treatment of external Voting Incentives.
Protocol-funded Voting Incentives have now become a significant part of the Aquarius voting system.
In many cases, the incentives generated naturally from Aquarius trading fees are already large enough to influence where votes are directed without requiring the entire protocol fee share to be redistributed.
External Voting Incentives also play a smaller role than they previously did, particularly following changes such as asset whitelisting.
This creates an opportunity to rebalance how Aquarius uses the fees generated by the protocol, while ensuring that the burn mechanism only applies once trading activity reaches a meaningful level.
Rather than returning the full protocol fee share to voters at all levels of activity, a relatively small portion could be used to reduce AQUA supply when Aquarius generates more than $10 million in daily trading volume.
This creates a simple relationship:
More Aquarius trading activity above the threshold → more fees → more AQUA burned
There would be no fixed annual burn amount. The size of the burn would rise and fall naturally with protocol activity, and no burn would occur through this mechanism on days when trading volume is at or below the threshold.
The existing weekly process would remain largely unchanged.
Throughout the week, Aquarius collects its share of trading fees and records daily trading volume.
Every Wednesday:
Liquidity providers would continue to receive their existing 50% share in all cases.
The proposal does not introduce a new buyback process. Aquarius already converts its collected protocol fees into AQUA each Wednesday.
The change is that, on qualifying days, a portion of that AQUA would be permanently removed from circulation instead of being redistributed as Voting Incentives.
Assume Aquarius generated $10,000 in trading fees on a day when daily trading volume was greater than $10 million:
Now assume Aquarius generated $10,000 in trading fees on a day when daily trading volume was $10 million or less:
If qualifying trading activity increased, the amount burned would increase with it.
If qualifying trading activity decreased to $10 million or less per day, the burn would not apply for those days and the full protocol fee share would return to Voting Incentives.
External Voting Incentives would remain unaffected.
Any incentive deposited by a third party would continue to be distributed according to the existing Voting Incentive rules.
This proposal applies only to AQUA generated from Aquarius’s own share of trading fees.
The $10 million daily trading volume threshold would not affect external incentives, their distribution, or the rules governing them.
The burn would continue, subject to the daily trading volume threshold, until total AQUA supply reaches 50 billion AQUA.
At that point, the burn would pause automatically so the Aquarius community can reassess whether it should continue.
While the burn is paused, the fee split would temporarily return to:
A new governance proposal would then decide whether to:
The 50 billion AQUA level is therefore not intended to be a permanent supply floor.
It is a mandatory review point designed to ensure that any further reduction in AQUA supply receives fresh community approval.
The purpose of this proposal is to gradually reduce AQUA supply when Aquarius has achieved a meaningful level of trading activity, while allowing future governance to reconsider the mechanism as Aquarius develops.
By the time supply reaches 50 billion AQUA, protocol activity, emissions, Voting Incentives and AQUA’s wider tokenomics may look very different.
Rather than deciding today how far AQUA supply should ultimately be reduced, the burn would pause at 50 billion and allow the community to make a new decision based on the circumstances at that time.
The same review would also provide an opportunity to reassess whether the $10 million daily trading volume threshold remains appropriate.
The proposal would:
A vote in favour of this proposal would introduce a daily trading volume threshold of $10 million for the AQUA burn mechanism.
When daily trading volume is $10 million or less, the fee distribution would remain:
50% Liquidity Providers / 50% Voting Incentives
When daily trading volume is greater than $10 million, the fee distribution would become:
50% Liquidity Providers / 40% Voting Incentives / 10% AQUA Burn
The burn would continue, subject to the daily trading volume threshold, until total AQUA supply reaches 50 billion AQUA.
At that point, the burn would pause and the fee split would temporarily return to:
50% Liquidity Providers / 50% Voting Incentives
A new governance proposal would then determine whether the AQUA burn should resume or end, and whether the $10 million daily trading volume threshold should be retained or revised.
","start_at":"2026-11-09T00:00:00Z","end_at":"2026-11-15T23:59:59Z","is_simple_proposal":true,"proposal_status":"QUEUED","payment_status":"FINE","payment_verification_status":"FINE","last_updated_at":"2026-11-03T10:29:02.171673Z","vote_for_issuer":"GDILHZRNLXZOSWPH2IURABF5ABB3JZLPXZNSLJN2OOTEYGL4WUALR7B3","vote_against_issuer":"GC2VEARMPY62RDK7GS2CROG42GTXHVOXPUDWO2FPTAQA4WZSWKZMSUNP","vote_for_result":"0.0000000","vote_against_result":"0.0000000","aqua_circulating_supply":"0.0000000","discord_channel_url":"https://discord.com/channels/862710317825392660/1046931670458187836","discord_channel_name":null,"discord_username":"jason_cudmore","history_proposal":[{"version":1,"title":"Use 10% of Aquarius Trading Fees to Burn AQUA","text":"Aquarius currently splits trading fees:
This proposal would change the split to:
For every $1 of trading fees generated:
The existing weekly fee conversion would remain unchanged.
Every Wednesday, collected fees would continue to be converted into AQUA. The portion representing 40% of total trading fees would be distributed as Voting Incentives, while the portion representing 10% would be sent to the AQUA issuer account and permanently removed from circulation.
The burn would continue until total AQUA supply reaches 50 billion AQUA, at which point it would pause for a new governance review.
Protocol-funded Voting Incentives have now become a significant part of the Aquarius voting system.
In many cases, the incentives generated naturally from Aquarius trading fees are already large enough to influence where votes are directed without requiring the entire protocol fee share to be redistributed.
External Voting Incentives also play a smaller role than they previously did, particularly following changes such as asset whitelisting.
This creates an opportunity to rebalance how Aquarius uses the fees generated by the protocol.
Rather than returning the full protocol fee share to voters, a relatively small portion could instead be used to reduce AQUA supply.
This creates a simple relationship:
More Aquarius trading → more fees → more AQUA burned
There would be no fixed annual burn amount. The size of the burn would rise and fall naturally with protocol activity.
The existing weekly process would remain largely unchanged.
Throughout the week, Aquarius collects its share of trading fees.
Every Wednesday:
Liquidity providers would continue to receive their existing 50% share.
The proposal does not introduce a new buyback process. Aquarius already converts its collected protocol fees into AQUA each Wednesday.
The change is simply that a portion of that AQUA would be permanently removed from circulation instead of redistributed.
Example
If Aquarius generated $10,000 in trading fees:
If trading activity increased, the amount burned would increase with it.
If trading activity decreased, the amount burned would decrease.
External Voting Incentives would remain unaffected.
Any incentive deposited by a third party would continue to be distributed according to the existing Voting Incentive rules.
This proposal applies only to AQUA generated from Aquarius’s own share of trading fees.
The burn would continue until total AQUA supply reaches 50 billion AQUA.
At that point, the burn would pause automatically so the Aquarius community can reassess whether it should continue.
While the burn is paused, the fee split would temporarily return to:
A new governance proposal would then decide whether to:
The 50 billion AQUA level is therefore not intended to be a permanent supply floor.
It is a mandatory review point designed to ensure that any further reduction in AQUA supply receives fresh community approval.
The purpose of this proposal is to gradually reduce AQUA supply while allowing future governance to reconsider the mechanism as Aquarius develops.
By the time supply reaches 50 billion AQUA, protocol activity, emissions, Voting Incentives and AQUA’s wider tokenomics may look very different.
Rather than deciding today how far AQUA supply should ultimately be reduced, the burn would pause at 50 billion and allow the community to make a new decision based on the circumstances at that time.
The proposal would:
A vote in favour of this proposal would change the Aquarius trading fee distribution from:
50% Liquidity Providers / 50% Voting Incentives
to:
50% Liquidity Providers / 40% Voting Incentives / 10% AQUA Burn
The burn would continue until total AQUA supply reaches 50 billion AQUA.
At that point, the burn would pause and the fee split would temporarily return to:
50% Liquidity Providers / 50% Voting Incentives
A new governance proposal would then determine whether the AQUA burn should resume or end.
","created_at":"2026-09-29T23:14:03.230631Z"}],"created_at":"2026-09-29T23:14:03.230598Z","percent_for_quorum":20,"ice_circulating_supply":"62942055837.4709854","abstain_issuer":"GDPU2J3EVYVWSEUR335U3TQ4F7GHPOIWZEJ724NMF7GI272EICU5RR7T","vote_abstain_result":"0.0000000","proposal_type":"GENERAL","onchain_action_type":"NONE","onchain_action_args":[],"onchain_execution_status":"NOT_REQUIRED","onchain_execution_tx_hash":null,"onchain_execution_started_at":null,"onchain_execution_submitted_at":null,"onchain_execution_poll_count":0,"asset_code":null,"asset_issuer":null,"asset_contract_address":null,"asset_issuer_information":null,"asset_token_description":null,"asset_holder_distribution":null,"asset_liquidity":null,"asset_trading_volume":null,"asset_audit_info":null,"asset_stellar_flags":null,"asset_related_projects":null,"asset_community_references":null,"asset_aquarius_traction":null,"asset_issuer_commitments":null}